

From “Balkanization” toward “West-Balkanization”: The Republic of Macedonia’s Euro- Atlantic prospects

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Abstract

This paper follows the conceptual definitions offered in Eduard Said’s “Orientalization” and Maria Todorova’s “Balkanization” toward newly coined term of “West-Balkanization”, all as essential features of constructing the Otherness. In this sense, the identities generated by collective definition by the Other (The West), are seen in the abstract symbolic values of the region, which can be traced in real social and political events. Yet, in the modern age the only political perspective for the Balkan is integration with in the West. With the new mainstream of the political and economical integration of the Balkan countries into the European Union the legal frame for mutual direct communication and collaboration is being created. The future projections for this region are movement toward integration into the European Union. So the mutual European identity project can be imposed on the region of the Balkans itself. But at the same time Europe has created a West Balkan region, which besides being a symbolic waiting room, can be seen as political ghettoization of few problematic national issues and in David Noris terms as “the last line of defense against Muslim east”.

The second part of the paper is focused on the Republic of Macedonia, and its position during the last two decades. It refers to several aspects of the structural position of the country, as well as essential aspects of demography, inter-ethnic relations, regional politics and economy, all united under the Macedonia’s prospects for future Euro- Atlantic integration. The last can generate sense of political stability, but also an exclusion from negative symbolism related to historical “Balkanization” or future “West- Balkanization”.

Key words: Balkan, West Balkan, West, Orient, Macedonia, Stereotypes

Introduction

In this paper we are making an effort to analyze factors that determine the origin and symbolic meaning of the term “Balkanization”. In this sense the political significance of the definition of Otherness is closely connected with stereotyping. The Balkans as a politically abstract region offers the possibility to be a border region between East and West, but also as a geographically integrated area that compliments traditions and the future prospects.

Historically, the idea of “Balkanization” started in middle of nineteen century, when the rational West faced the remains of the Ottoman Empire. The mystification of the East in this period included both Christian and Muslims, which were carriers of an exotic irrational past. At the same time Western prospects of the Balkan population were recognized and manifested through the Enlightenment and the attempts to create their own past, connected with the Western values. So, the road to independent westernized nation- states was created. But, in southeastern Europe does not rule the climbing that the nation has created independent state, as the romanticist nationalists dreamed. As a matter of fact, the leaders of new states were forced to create the nation from the peasant society and the world-view coming from their “*non legitimate Ottoman past*” (Мазовер, 2003: 122).¹ The beginning of twentieth century promoted the great national concepts of the Balkan states. In the search of their own identity, the Balkan nations tried to define their national frameworks based on the idea of ethnic identity with a strong linguistic core (Todorova, 2009: 240).

Modern education, architecture, fashion and state organization, were not sufficient for the Balkan states to be accepted as an integral part of the symbolic West. The Balkan wars, both in 1912-13 and the 1990-s, together with Communist period of domination (1945-1991), left the Balkans as a region of irrational politics and, negative stereotypes, with little prospect for total Westernization. Even with opened prospects for EU and NATO integration for some of the Balkan countries,

¹ Todorova will notice: “*Of the political legacies that have shaped the southeast European peninsula as a whole (the period of Greek antiquity, Hellenism, Roman rule, etc.), two can be singled out as crucial until the 19th century. One is the millennium of Byzantium with its profound political, institutional, legal, religious and general cultural impact. The other is the half millennium of Ottoman rule that gave the peninsula its name, and established the longest period of political unity it had experienced. Not only did part of Southeastern Europe acquire a new name during this period, it has been chiefly the Ottoman elements or the ones perceived as such which have mostly invoked the current stereotype of the Balkans. In the narrow sense of the word, then, one can argue that the Balkans are, in fact, the Ottoman legacy*” (Todorova, 2005: 69).

Western powers had reservations that the region would be entirely integrated. Pure political integration does not mean integration of values. Parallel to this, in the beginning of twenty first century, a new imaginative region of the “West Balkans” was established, mainly by European Union bureaucracy. This term, in very short time managed to synthesize both Orientalism and Balkanization, creating new abstract reality.

Orientalism, Balkanization and West-balkanization

In his famous book “*Orientalism*”, Edward Said begins with the assumption that the Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely *there*, just as the Occident itself is not just *there*. If men make their own history, what they can know is what they have made, and extending this idea to geography: both geo-graphical and cultural entities—to say nothing of historical entities—such as locales, regions, or geographical sectors as “Orient” and “Occident” are man-made. “*Therefore as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other*” (Said, 1977: 4,5).

In this sense Said refers on unequal distribution of values construction, where because of its economic, political and cultural dominance, the West becomes the standard of defining the “oriental” Otherness. Furthermore the process of rationalization, individualization and liberalization promotes the West as a carrier of the Civilization² itself (Elijas, 2001). The Western view of the East was based on magical exoticness, which is felt or as a taboo, or is repulsive, which imposes on the East a natural inferiority (Said, 1977: 37-76).³ Through this can be applied to the

² The function of “Civilization” in western self conscience contains “*the progress itself, which the western society believes that it has created versus the previous centuries, but also and in relation to modern “primitive” societies. Those, the western society is determining with the markers of its pride: technical development, their ethics, development of scientific knowledge and their vision of the world, and many other things*” (Elijas, 2001: 55).

³ Said noted: “*For the Orient idioms became frequent, and these idioms took firm hold in European discourse. Beneath the idioms there was a layer of doctrine about the Orient; this doctrine was fashioned out of the experiences of many Europeans, all of them converging upon such essential aspects of the Orient as the Oriental character, Oriental despotism, Oriental sensuality, and the like. For any European during the nineteenth century—and I think one can say this almost without qualification—Orientalism was such a system of truths, truths in Nietzsche's sense of the word. It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric. Some of the*

past, some of the modern thinkers are even referring to non-West as Other, searching for demarcations and distinctions of the world civilizations and not offering possibility for understanding or integration.⁴

Following this pattern Maria Todorova in her *"Imagining the Balkans"*⁵, shifts the focus from the West- Orient relations, to the narrow region of South-East Europe, or the area frequently referred to as the Balkans. Since the nineteen century, the writers from the West are have offered, often opposite views of the Balkan people. What is significant in that period, and even today, is the easiness with which anthropologists emphasize single events to produce generalizations that can be applied to a wider region. In the expressed racial vocabulary of nineteen century, the "Turks" are seen an Asiatic nomad people and as an antitheses of European civilization (Mazobep, 2008: 192). For Croatian Dubravka Ugresic, the positive stereotypes are exclusively reserved for the West, and negative for the East.⁶ For Todorova the Western discourse of the Balkan does not originate from

immediate sting will be taken out of these labels if we recall additionally that human societies, at least the more advanced cultures, have rarely offered the individual anything but imperialism, racism, and ethnocentrism for dealing with "other" cultures. So Orientalism aided and was aided by general cultural pressures that tended to make more rigid the sense of difference between the European and Asiatic parts of the world" (Said, 1977: 203, 204).

⁴ For example Samuel P. Huntington in his famous essay *"The Clash of Civilizations?"*, which later was extended into a book, claims that the world conflicts in post Cold War era are determined from the fault lines of the civilizations (Huntington, 1993).

⁵ Except Maria Todorova's *"Imagining the Balkans"*, significant impact had and several other editions as: Vesna Goldsworthy's *"Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination"*, Stathis Gourgouris *"Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece"*, Milica Bakic's *"Nesting Orientalism"*, Obrad Sabic and Bjelic's (ed.) *"Balkan as a Metaphor"* and others.

⁶ West Europe (Right, Organized, Democracy, Civilized, Legitimate, Rational, Pointed toward the future, Established system of values and criteria, Individualism, Citizen)-East(Left, Disorganized, Democracy seen only through democratic symbols, Primitivism, Non legitimate, Myths, Necrophilic obsession from the past, Non existence of system, Collective conscience, Nationalism) (Noris, 1999: 62). Like *Orientalism*, *Balkanism* has been organized around a sense of binaries (rational/irrational, center/periphery, civilization/barbarism) arranged hierarchically so that the first sign ("Whiteness" of "Europe"), is always primary and definitional of the second ("Blackness" of "Balkans"), and is that the second is always a grammatical, internal effect of the first...The question that remains whatever is whether or not every system of colonial representation based on binaries is by

the historical Balkan backwardness, but from the unreal romanticism projected toward the Balkans (Todorova, 2009: 59).

The Balkans have become a “*place*” in a discourse-geography, presented as an object of coherent body of knowledge – *Balkanism*. Bjelic argues that the term *Balkanism* has changeable meanings. Sometimes it refers to the body of knowledge about the Balkans, and sometimes to the critical study of this very discourse. *Balkanism* in the first sense delivers substantive knowledge about the Balkans without examining the presuppositions upon which this knowledge has been generated, for example Robert D. Kaplan in his book “*Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*”. As in Maria Todorova’s book “*Imagining the Balkans*”, *Balkanism* in the second sense examines the Balkans in relation to suppositions constitutive of *Balkanism* in the first sense- that is, as an epistemology (Bjelic, 2002: 5). Kiossev continues this debate focusing on few questions. “*Thus, along with questioning the numeric identity of the Balkans, one should ask whether or not there are groups or individuals who feel that they belong to the Balkans. The first question is, “What are the Balkans?” ...The second question is then, “Who is Homo Balkanicus?” . In other words, what collective and what individual, recognize itself as Balkan? These questions might further lead us to several others: Does Homo Balkanicus exist at all? What nuances distinguish the feeling of belonging, or non-belonging, to the Balkans?*”(Kiossev, 2002: 167).

Mocnik clearly states that the stereotype of the Balkanist kind may serve as privileged instrument that enables a particular ideology capable of incorporating such stereotype into its own discourse, to invent, and eventually appropriate the position of knowing subject of the national zero- institution. “*Balkanist stereotypes and others like them, can work as shifting devices: What more, the shifting the stereotype supports does not limit itself to the relatively benign interpretational effects of understanding – the stereotype incorporates different ideological backgrounds into the prevailing framework of common sense. It may serve as the royal road toward the ideological hegemony.*” (Mocnik, 2002: 102, 103).

As for Mishkova the idea of the Balkans entwined of the project of modernity with notion of “Europe, or the enlightenment of utopian and real meanings, that accounts for the resilience of the term “Europe” and for the difficulties involved in any attempt to unravel its autonomy. The “idea of Europe” spawned over time and of the analytical objections to treating “(Western) Europe” as an entity and a coherent unit of analysis. It is, at the same time, easier to presume

definition Orientalism or, more importantly, are the binaries of Said’s good for the marginals and outsiders? (Bjelic, 2002: 3).

that just as the discourse of Balkanism has helped to shape the self-understanding of Europe, so too have Balkan perceptions of Europe shaped local narratives of collective cultural and social identity (Mishkova, 2007: 5,6).

Yet, the fact is that there is no mutual Western stereotype for the Balkan. This does not mean that there are not mutual western patterns of construction, but that there is no unified West. In this sense there are many different relevant political and intellectual discourses, dispersion of attitudes and opinions inside the different Balkan countries (Todorova, 2009: 170). But the Balkan people always built perceptions of them-self's not as a part of the East and the Orient, but as an integral part of the West. The offer by the West for inclusion into their cultural zone through romanticism, ideology and nation state, from Balkan point of view, is an opportunity to gain recognition and obtain a guarantee for its own historically legitimate political ambitions (Noris, 1999: 40). This process of cultural evolution has taken place over centuries and continues to the present day. The cultural adaptation to the "Western" standards is a precondition for integration into the Euro- Atlantic institutions, which for the different Balkan people is a guarantee for their own national legitimization, first in the framework of the region and later into the global world order.

The recent moves toward EU and NATO integration promote a new imaginative region of West Balkan⁷. But the name "West", does not offer symbolical interaction with the term "Balkan", creating a less integrative symbolic approach. West Balkan was a political creation, which later develops in all other realms of social life and interaction.⁸ In a political sense, West Balkan integrates the

⁷ West Balkan by territory initially was defined as "Ex- Yugoslavia minus Slovenia, plus Albania", or it includes Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania.

See more <http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/political-map-of-the-western> or <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/westernbalkansmap.html>.

But, the last tendencies are to exclude Croatia from the region. For example, see <http://www.balkansgeotourism.travel/index.php>.

⁸ In this sense the term "Balkan" was used without political connotation or reflections in some cases, for example when is derived from the context of the narrow geographic region "Balkan" connected with Balkan Mountains in Bulgaria. This usage of the term has only positive stereotypes connected with it. Opposite to this "West Balkan" as pure politically developed term does not offer extraction of its negative presumptions. For example, even the usage of this term in sense of pure geography,

“unstable” Balkans, offering the rest of the region to disengage from negative stereotypes, and, at the same time, creates a new imaginative region that can serve as a political ghetto. Open national questions as Serbian, Albanian and Macedonian, together with a significant part of Balkan Muslim population are isolated with promise that this is the fastest road for integration within the West. The basic question is: *“Does the new process of West-Balkanization, offer better prospects of the region, or just create preconditions for future instability?”*

Republic of Macedonia: Between Balkanization and Europeanization

In the 1990-s with the big changes in Eastern Europe, Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had transformed its political and economic system into pluralistic democracy and free market economy. But the instability in federation produced further changes, which resulted in disintegration of Yugoslavia and the formation on new nation- states. Macedonian independence can be traced to September 8, 1991, when independence was established through referendum. New challenges were numerous. Economic and political stability, together with international recognition were the first issues tackled.⁹

In the next twenty years Macedonia encountered numerous problems such as securing its economic and political stability, integrational challenges toward Euro-Atlantinc institutions and sustaining its unitary character. In the middle of the last decade of the twentieth century, the Republic of Macedonia was positioning its status in the international community as a novel country, facing economy sanctions brought against Federal Republic Yugoslavia (FRY) and a unilateral blockade by Greece. With recognition from USA, and the start of bilateral negotiations with Greece concerning “the name issue”, the focus shifted toward Euro- Atlantic integrations (EU and NATO). But in 1999, stability was challenged with the Kosovo crises, and later in 2001, the conflict in its own borders. The last ten years

nature or tourism promotions (See “The West Balkan, Land of Discovery”), contains a covert political message.

⁹ First multi partial elections for Macedonian parliament were on September 24, 1990. In January 1991, Kiro Gligorov was elected for first president of the republic. Previously, on January 25, 1991 was adopted “The Declaration for independence of SR Macedonia”. On the base of this Declaration, on September 8, 1991 on referendum was proclaimed the independence, and on November 17, 1991 the first constitution was proclaimed. On April 8, 1993 the Republic of Macedonia (under the provisional name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) was accepted as a member of United Nations, becoming 181th member country.

have been characterized by the process of stabilization, inner reforms, and the start of the integration processes toward EU and NATO.

In sense of nation building models, the process depends on several key factors. For Raphael Utz successful nations are defined as democratically constituted nations. From this point of view he argues that democracy is the natural form of government for nations, and that nationalism and democracy depend on each other (Utz, 2005: 615-647). In the case of the Republic of Macedonia, from the first day of independence there is no alternative to democracy. But developing democratic capacities of the state institutions is also a challenge. The main problem is the transformation of traditional authoritarian discourse into individual citizen and voter based democracy. Creating democratic traditions has faced problems in several areas, for instance inter-ethnic relations, elections, NGOs or civil sector and media control.

The second significant element that Utz addresses is the role of the elites in the nation building process. Though it may appear to be easier to reach a sufficient degree of consensus among relatively and small and well-educated number of individuals rather than across a wide population. According to Utz, most members of any given elite represent vested interests, regions, or professions and reaching an agreement is by no means a foregone conclusion (Ibidem). In the case of Macedonia, the elites have different origins and several motivations. Significant levels of the elites (economic, political and intellectual) are the product of the late stage of the pre- independence period. Transforming the generations of elites is a process parallel to the global nation building. Also the elites are very often motivated by ethnic, regional, and especially traditional interests of the larger kinship group interests, which influence the process of building a sense of mutual interests and national homogenization.

And the third segment pointed out by Utz is the role of symbolic institutions. For him, it is important to keep in mind that in a national context, all public institutions take on an additional symbolic meaning: not only are they supposed to perform certain political, social or economic functions but they also form a visible surface of the nation. The historical record would suggest that it can be helpful to remove predominantly symbolic institutions from the political fray as much as possible in order to preserve their meaningfulness beyond political partisanship (Ibidem). In the Republic of Macedonia the usage of symbolic institutions in the sense of political and ethnic mobilization has always been present. Political ideology in the global world framework incorporates national symbols and uses national manifestations for generating support. But from the other side in the case of Macedonia there is an opposite process in some of the political options, which differently motivated (ethnic or ideology differences) create voluntarily

based self- exclusion from the usage of those national symbolic institutions. The last one is not limited to political mobilization but also, includes the necessity of building institutional and state loyalty and, sustaining a certain level of symbolically based group cohesion.

Nation and state building in the Republic of Macedonia depends on numerous factors, which address the economical capacities of the state, inter- ethnic relations, regional stability, functional democracy, and integration in EU and NATO.

Regional stability is one of the most important factors for creating preconditions for successful development of all aspects of progress in Macedonia. If the Balkans (in last ten years limited to the newly created region of Western Balkan) do not provide stability there are no long-term prospects for successful state and nation building in any of the countries in the region.

With the end of the Cold War period, in the Balkans were actualized three national questions, under which the last decade of twentieth century was marked with rise of collective emotions and growth of nationalisms. The first question is the Serbian question, related to the space of the ex-SFR Yugoslavia, where the Serbian communities were used for generating the Greater Serbian idea. The same question today is related to the political status of Serbian entity of the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the status of Serbian population in enclaves in Kosovo. We should point out that the priority that has been given to this question in 1990-s in the territory of Croatia, after the forced migration on the Serbians from Kninska Kraina, has today lost its actuality; The second question which led to the awaking of nationalism is the Albanian question, connected with the final solution of the status of Kosovo and the status of Albanians in Macedonia, together united with the radical idea of the creation a Greater Albania; The third question, is the Macedonian question. This last question has significant differences from the previous two in the fact that it is not connected with the great national idea of Greater Macedonia, but is manifested by cultural and historical clash with Greece, connected with the differences concerning the name issue and the recognition of Macedonian minority in Greek Macedonia, non recognizing of the Macedonian Orthodox Church by the Serbian Orthodox Church and the differences with Bulgaria in the reading of history. All together, these problems are united around the idea of not recognizing Macedonian national identity as separate and independent.

The last tendencies of the integration of the countries of South-East Europe in EU and NATO, leads to the promotion of the West Balkans, as imaginative region which is uniting, and on that way ghettoize previous three mentioned

questions.¹⁰ But the transferring of the pejorative perception and terminology from the Balkan, to the region of Western Balkan, does not offer quick solutions for the existing problems and integration into European Union institutions in the near future. Quite the opposite, this type of isolation only increases the danger of creating new conflicts. The manifest expression of this kind of potential conflict situation is expressed by the intentions of radical nationalisms so the Balkan nations use this situation of created an historical vacuum for their own interest, but on behalf of their neighbors.

Economic development has always been a state and national priority in the Republic of Macedonia. After the dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia the economic sustainability of the market was reshaped into smaller economies of the newly formatted nation states. The economic crisis was intensified with the transformation of the economies toward the free market. All of the resulting republics, except Slovenia, went through a long time of painful transformation. In the case of Macedonia's economy, additional problems in the early stages were created by economic blockade from Greece and sanctions toward FR Yugoslavia, and later the political crises produced by the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the conflict in 2001 in Macedonia. The last several years have been marked by the world economic crisis and its influence in the region.

Structural reforms produced by the different governments in the Republic of Macedonia created preconditions for boosting development, but the investments are yet dependent of the perception of regional (in)stability. Parallel to the economic development is the process of decreasing population produced by a low birth rate and physical resettlement, which resulted with mass economic migration in certain regions of the country. In the future this may be the biggest problem facing not just Macedonia, but also other countries in the region.

Inter- ethnic relations is the core of keeping Macedonia's prospects open. For Adamson and Jovic Macedonian national identity revolves around the concepts of 'full statehood' and 'majority'. This implies a diminution of the collective political status of Macedonian Albanians. Albanian nationalist platforms contest the moral validity of the Constitution, which embodies these concepts. At the same

¹⁰ Based on previous context there is Western perception for the Balkan and Adriatic's (today transferred on the Western Balkan) as "last line for control and defense against the Muslim East" (Noris, 2002: 18). From this point of view Western Balkan as continuation of the Ottoman Empire is related with the Turkish integration into European institutions. Also we can expect after closing the final status of Kosovo and finding final political solution accepted by the Security Council and International community, Serbia will take the primary position and become a leader on the Western Balkan region.

time the very identity of both the Macedonian state and the Macedonian nation was questioned or even denied by many in both Greece and Bulgaria. Macedonian politicians capitalised on the popular feeling that outsiders opposed the right of the Macedonians to have ‘their own’ nation-state, to call it Macedonia, and to call themselves Macedonians. The Albanian parties, in contesting the nation-state constitution, became attached in Macedonian nationalist discourse to the series of enemies or ‘negative others’, against which they endeavoured to forge Macedonian unity and a new political identity. According to the Albanian parties, this barrier was deliberately created and maintained by the representatives of the Macedonian majority who used their electoral dominance unjustly in order to maintain the political, social and economic subordination of the Albanians. The Albanian parties’ discourse therefore constructed a link between the lack of an appropriate collective status and subordination (Adamson Kevin and Dejan Jovic. 2004: 293-311).

From the other side, the nationalistic ambitions of certain political representatives of the Albanian minority overcome the framework of gaining more rights and manifested itself by proclaiming the creation of “Greater Albania”. This produced fear in the Macedonian majority concerning the unitary character of the state. The product of the lack of integration of the Albanians in Macedonian institutions and radical nationalistic pretensions toward secession, as well the general regional instability produced by the Kosovo crisis produced armed conflict in 2001. The end of the conflict resulted in the Ohrid Framework Agreement and further reforms, which addressed such issues as equal representation, use of the language and symbols of ethnic groups, decentralization and education.¹¹

The last tendencies are moving toward the parallel processes of nation building among Macedonians and Albanians in the sense of symbolic usage of the identity manifestation. This is stimulated mainly by political representation on the ethnic level and boosted by segregation in educational processes on all levels. Bi-

¹¹ In International Crisis Group from August 2011, there are incidents which can influence negatively on the coexistence. They noticed progress in equal representation, especially in the division of resors in newly formed government. “The scope of Albanian language usage was one of the most difficult issues in the Ohrid negotiations. Albanians demanded “equal status” with Macedonian. Macedonians argued this would break the first basic principle of the agreement that “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia as well as the unitary character of the state cannot be violated and must be sustained” “ (Macedonia: Ten years of conflict, 2011: 1-27).

“But education is becoming more segregated. In some schools with children of different ethnicities, there is studying in separate shifts or buildings. At the extra-curricular level, there is “no institutional support for stimulating positive inter-ethnic cooperation”.” (Ibidem)

national prospects are jeopardizing the multicultural definition of the state. But the real challenge is not in modification of unification of parallel national prospects, but in keeping the unitary character of the state and state building in the sense of manifesting mutual loyalty toward the institutions. This demands further integration without assimilation, but also regional stability, which can be provided, by integration of the Republic of Macedonia into EU and NATO.

EU and NATO integration were always top priorities in Macedonia's strategic interests. According to Jurekovic, in order to keep its mainly positive influence on the process of nation and state building in the Western Balkans, the EU must take care of the following challenges:

- The EU must provide the countries of the Western Balkans not only with a list of standards they should implement, but also with a clear time-table with regard of their integration into the EU. Otherwise the EU-integration process could become too abstract and therefore lose its attraction for the Western Balkan countries, which could then fall back into the old antagonist scheme (Jurekovic, 2005: 210-224). In the case of the Republic of Macedonia, the setback produced by decision of Greece to obstruct NATO integration at the Bucharest summit, and the delay of the start of formal negotiations for EU membership due to regional instability can create preconditions for eventual future destabilization in the country.
- Political stability very much depends on satisfying economic conditions. The Balkan countries still have big problems in this regard. The high unemployment rate (30-40% in most of the western Balkan countries) will not get under control without the structural funds of the EU (Ibidem). In this context we offered analyses in previous part of this paper. The support from EU funds can be crucial in next decade.
- In order to remain an important political factor the EU must not overestimate its influence. For the EU there is only a thin line between playing a constructive role and lapsing into colonial behavior (Ibidem). Partnership between the EU and Macedonia depends on concessions from both sides. The EU can provide support in establishing structural reforms, but this does not mean that the Macedonian government's does not have the right independently to define state priorities. The last remark also does not exclude the responsibility of political representatives in Macedonia for making political decisions.
- The EU can only be successful if it holds strong links to NATO and the USA. The EU has shown its willingness to take over the responsibility for

Peace Support Operations in the Western Balkans from NATO. But still NATO's presence is very important for the successful transformation of the armed forces of the Balkan countries. The EU, NATO and PfP accession processes are all congruent processes that contribute to a system of co-operative security in the Western Balkans (Ibidem).

Political stability and the development of democratic capacities are at the core of the definition of Macedonian society. Developing democratic capacities depends on the concrete political action of all partners in the political processes, and development of institutional capacities of the state organization in general. The first action depends on the work of the Parliament, including political dialog between ruling and opposition parties and successful organization of elections, as concrete political events. The reforms in concrete segments of the state institutions are also priority for successful state and nation building in the future. The focus in the last years has been on functioning of public administration, judiciary reforms and the media (Macedonia: Ten years after the conflict, 2011: 1-27).

“Name issue” has become the main obstacle for integration of the Republic of Macedonia into the EU and NATO, at the same time not allowing faster economic development and creating the situation of potential future economic or political destabilization. Despite the fact that Macedonia was the only former Yugoslav Republic to become independent without war, nation and state-building there has developed under difficult external and internal conditions: Greece still refuses to recognize Macedonia under its official name. Jurekovic states that the Greek explanation that the Macedonian government could raise territorial claims on the northern part of Greece with the name Macedonia seems ludicrous. Nevertheless, the consequent pressure applied by Greece on this issue meant that Macedonia has had to accept the supplement “Former Yugoslav Republic” to its name. For that reason Macedonia is the only successor of the Socialist Yugoslavia, which as far as its name is concerned, is not allowed to end its Yugoslav chapter (Jurekovic, 2005: 210-224).

The basic models of nation- building in the Republic of Macedonia include both, civil and ethnic aspects. In the “Name Issue” conflict, the main reason for Greece is to limit every national building myth in today's territory of Republic Macedonia. In this way Greece should gain a monopoly not only on the Ancient Macedonian heritage of Alexander the Great, but also on Slav Macedonian originated values of Cyril's and Methodius origins from Salonika. The problem for the Republic of Macedonia is that the most prominent forefathers of the nation such as Goce Delchev or Krste Misirkov, also have their origin in today's “Greek Macedonia”. At the same time the Greek nation building process creates the vision of so called “Slavophone” population, people who speak the Slavic language, but

are Greeks by nationality, which is based on the power of “legitimate” assimilation of 19-th century “Greek high culture”, and which can be considered racist. In recent history, this created situations of genocide against the Macedonian minority, including the last case in the Greek Civil War period when more than 25 thousand Macedonian children were expelled from their homes. Finally, the Greek argument of monopolization of the name from the Macedonian side is not the product of the desire of the Macedonian state or institutions, but the international status of the Republic of Macedonia.

Conclusion

Balkanization is a term the symbolic meaning of which was established in the mid nineteenth century Balkans, later becoming synonymous with fragmentation and backwardness even outside of its native region. Building the stereotypes for the region of the Balkans is closely connected with the Western view of the Oriental Otherness. The political significance of generating visions is pre determined by the character of those visions. Military, economic and cultural superiority in last two hundred years allowed privileged the West to construct their own view for the Balkan people, which can be subsequently projected and accepted by the very people they were created to represent. In this sense, the newly coined term “West Balkan”, as a political creation of the EU bureaucracy, was projected as symbolic waiting room for one part of the Balkan countries. But tendencies for “West-Balkanization” are not to offer fast international prospects, but by ghettoizing, to isolate some of the problematic issues in the wider region of the Balkan. At the same time, in the future the pejorative stereotypes are expected to shift from “Imaginative Balkan” to “Imaginative West- Balkan”.

West Balkan contains all three of the remaining open national questions in the region: Serbian, Albanian and Macedonian, but also contains the majority of Balkan Muslim population (with the exception of Turkey). This imposes unstable political perspectives on the region, and also connects it with its Ottoman past and with future influence from Republic of Turkey. Every future destabilization of one of the mentioned national questions, or other political action, can be expected to influence and even destabilize this entire region.

The Republic of Macedonia as an integral part of the West Balkan region is subjected to all previously mentioned problems. The future prospects of the country depends on several factors, such as regional stability, economic development, inter-ethnic relations, EU and NATO integration, inner political stability and development of democratic capacities and solving the Name Issue.

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